No CVE Doesn’t Mean No Risk

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Your awareness program teaches people to distrust a link in an email. Does it teach them to distrust a caller who already knows their name?

That call is all Windrelay needs. The victim installs an app, taps their card on their phone and types their PIN. The card never leaves their hand, and it pays out at an ATM on another continent.

Attackers accept that it doesn’t scale. Past the first minute of the call, the payout is close to guaranteed.

There’s no vendor fix, because this is regular Android behavior. Blocking sideloading on company-managed phones stops it before it lands. For everyone else, the control is one you already trust.

Multi-factor authentication, applied to phone calls. Yuri Witt and Rob Maas show how in 16 minutes.

What you’ll learn

  • Treat phone calls like logins. A call claiming to be your bank is one factor.
  • Why attackers accept an attack that doesn’t scale. Cloning is high volume with poor results.
  • Where the setting sits. A personalized RAT silently adds the relay app through Android’s accessibility settings, with no consent pop-up.

Your cybersecurity experts

Rob Maas

Rob Maas

Field CTO
ON2IT

Jelle Konings

Yuri Wit

Security Reasearcher
ON2IT

Episode details

Card fraud used to be a copying problem: a skimmer on an ATM, a cloned card, a batch of stolen data sold on. Windrelay drops the copy. The victim’s own card, in the victim’s own hand, is proxied through the victim’s phone to an attacker’s phone held against a terminal or ATM somewhere else. Rob compares it to sliding your card into an ATM abroad at the same moment you tap it at home.

That changes the attacker’s economics. Cloning is a wide net with poor results: cards that are missing data, have been updated, or don’t work with the banking system. This relay is the opposite. It needs reconnaissance on each target, a phone call, and an accomplice at a terminal, so it doesn’t scale. But Yuri points out that once the attacker gets past the first minute of the call, the result is close to guaranteed. Sometimes the attackers even set up a loan in the victim’s name first, so they know the cash is there. Banks can reject a stale clone. A live card is much harder to argue with.

For defenders, the uncomfortable part is that there’s nothing to patch. No vendor fix exists, because this is regular Android behavior abused through accessibility settings. On company-managed Android phones, blocking sideloading stops the attack before the RAT ever lands. Yuri is clear that this attack targets people, not employers, and most people have no MDM policy behind them at home.

That leaves the human control, and Yuri frames it in terms security teams already use: multi-factor authentication for conversations. A phone call claiming to be your bank is one factor. Confirm it through a second, independent channel: the banking app, or the official number you look up yourself. Your people take these calls at home, and the habit they build there is the one they bring to work. The question for your organization is whether your awareness program teaches them to treat a phone call with the same suspicion as a login prompt.

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